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tories agreed to take jurisdiction (and recognize foreign courts
judgments)- over. overseas manufacturers of defective goods, either
causing damage within the jurisdiction of the forum, or where they
were used or purchased within the jurisdiction but where . the
damage was- sustained elsewhere, would seem desirable. Such an
assertion of jurisdiction would probably be confined to cases in
which it was reasonable for the foreign manufacturer to foresee
the use of the product within the jurisdiction in question or that
damage might result in the particular jurisdiction .
ISSETT-JOHNSON *

HUSBAND AND WIFE-AGREEMENT IN CONTEMPLATION OF MARRIAGE-CONSTITUTION AND TERMS OF AN EXPRESS TRUST.-The

simplest facts are not always susceptible to the most straightforward legal analysis. Although not exactly commonplace, the facts
in Re Merikallio' were simple enough . Shortly before their marriage in 1960, the deceased and his intended bride visited the
latter's solicitor and, in contemplation of marriage, executed an
agreement under seal. The agreement recited that the deceased
desired to make "certain provisions for his future wife" and "to
assure her financial security and well-being"! There followed a
number of convenants of which the first read as follows:
That the Party of the first part [the deceased] shall forthwith deposit the
sum of $20,000 .00 in bonds or other negotiable securities for the purpose of buying a house together with the Party of the second part . - . .
and the said property to be held as joint tenants and not as tenants
in common, and the Parties covenant' further that this type of ownership shall not in the future be changed or amended and the said sum of
$20,000 .00 in bonds or otherwise shall be forthwith delivered to . . . [the
wife's solicitor] .
. and he shall hold in trust the said bonds which
will in all probability be registered in the name of the Party of the
first part and the said bonds will be held until the purchasing of the
said home together with other furniture or other requirements up to
the amount of $20,000 .00 or until both parties by written direction
do instruct him otherwise or until any competent Court would adjudge
the question of the said bonds.

The bonds were delivered to the solicitor on the same day and
remained in his possession until the death of the deceased in
*A. Bissett-Johnson, LL.B . (Nott .), LL.M . (Mich .), of the Inner
Temple, Barrister at Law, Senior Lecturer in Law, Monash University Law
School, Clayton, Victoria .
.L (3d) 142 . An appeal from this decision
D
.
'[19701 1 O.R . 244, S .R
was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on May 13th, 1970 .
'These recitals are not mentioned in the report of the case at first instance . The writer is grateful to Mr. P . A. Vesa, B.A., LL .B., for an opportunity to read the documents in the case .
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1966 . In due course, as no house had been purchased, an application was made to the late Mr. Justice Ferguson to determine
whether the bonds belonged to the widow or formed part of the
deceased's estate .
The learned judge found in favour of the widow . His' reasons
consisted of a statement that the solicitor held the bonds subject
to an express trust and a quotation from Williams on Executors'
which was described as providing the "answer to the problem".'
The finding that the solicitor was a trustee is not without
interest . The bonds were merely deposited with him, there appears
to have been no change in registration and, at the most, he could
have been trustee of an equitable interest only. To accept this
conclusion is to treat the deceased as being in the same position
as if he had declared himself a trustee of his legal interest for
the solicitor who was to hold the equitable trust on further trusts .
Although an unusual and awkward construction it is difficult to
see how else the finding can be explained . It does not appear to
be inconsistent with basic principles of equity . In the words of
Sir Raymond Evershed M.R. in Re Rose:'
If a man executes a document transferring all his equitable interest,
say, in shares, that document, operating and intending to operate, as a
transfer, will give rise to and take effect as a trust ; for the assignor
will then be a trustee of the legal estate in the shares for the person
in whose favour he has made an assignment of his beneficial interest.
Any objection based on the principle that equity will not perfect an imperfect gift would seem to be met by the clear indication on the face of the agreement that the deceased might remain
registered as legal owner of the bonds. The principle applies only
where the legal owner attempts ineffectually to make a transfer
of the legal title, as in Milroy v. Lords and many other cases .' The
wording of the agreement supports a conclusion that the deceased
intended to constitute the solicitor a trustee while retaining the
legal title: that, in other words, he intended to transfer merely an
equitable interest.
The reference to Williams on Executors is rather more perplexing. In the first place, it is not easy to see the connexion
between the finding that the solicitor was a trustee and the passage
3 (11th ed ., 1921), p. 504.
4 Supra, footnote 1, at pp. 246 (O.R.), 144 (D.L.R.) .
55 [1952] Ch. 499, at p. 510 .
(1862), 4 De G.F. & J. 264.
' E.g., Gott V. Gott (1862), 9 Gr. 165; McGee v. Lewis and McGee
(1967), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 362 (Alta A.D.) ; Macedo v. Stroud, [192212 A.C.
330; Re Wale, [19561 1 W.L.R. 1346 (Ch .D.) ; Olsson v. Dyson (1969),
43 A.L.J.R. 77; Cope v. Keene (1968), 42 A.L.J.R. 169; cf. Nesbitt v.
Chester, [19691 1 O.R. 143; Re Mellen, [1933] O.W.N. 118, 246 ; Re Halley
Estate (1959), 43 M.P.R. 79 (S.C. Nfid) ; Taylor v. Deputy Commissioner
of Taxation (1969), 43 A.W.R. 237 .
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quoted from the treatise . It is true that the ultimate decision that
the bonds did not form part of the deceased's testamentary estate
presupposed the existence of a trust inter vivos . The quotation,
however, contains a description of the equitable doctrine of conversion according to which "land is under some circumstances
regarded as money, and money as land" . Granted that the solicitor
was a trustee, it is clear that his obligation under the trust did
not extend beyond retaining possession of the bonds until the
occurrence of one of the events specified in the agreement. 18[e
was under no duty to purchase a house for the parties and it is
difficult to see any useful analogy between his position and that of a
trustee with an obligation to convert personalty into realty . Moreover, even if one focuses not on the solicitor but on the deceased
as the trustee with a duty to purchase the property, the' doctrine
of conversion appears to have no relevance. As the bonds were
held not to form part of the deceased's estate, the widow's right
to the bonds must have arisen under the trust and the establishment
of that right could not depend upon whether the bonds were to
be treated as realty or personalty. If she had died shortly after
her husband and had left her realty to one person and her personalty to another; - the principles of conversion would have had
some relevance. This was not so where the existence of her own
beneficial rights was in question .'
At the hearing of an appeal from the decision of Ferguson J< .,
counsel for the widow was not called upon and no written or
oral reasons for the decision were delivered at the termination of
the appellant's argument . As had been done in the court below,
it was assumed that the solicitor was a trustee and counsel for
the appellant sought to establish a resulting trust in favour of the
deceased! He argued first that the doctrine of conversion was
inapplicable in the absence of an imperative duty to purchase a
house. The members of the court appear to have taken the view
that the duty existed and that the purchase of a house was not
merely one of three optional courses of action contemplated in
the agreement. When it was then argued that the purpose for which
the trust had been established had failed, MacKay J.A ., referred
with approval to the old principle that a. party shall not be allowed
to take advantage of his own wrongdoing.'* His Lordship expressed the opinion that, in the absence of evidence, the court
'The quotation begins with a reference to the principle on which the
doctrine of conversion is based, viz. "things shall be considered as actually
done, which ought to have been done". Although, at first blush, this principle might seem to have some relevance to the problem before the court,
it is submitted that it was no more relevant than it is to any case in which
a beneficiary claims to enforce an active duty imposed on the trustee .
s The writer was present at the hearing of the appeal .
to His lordship cited IVew Zealand Shipping Company v . Société des
Ateliers et Chantiers de France, [1919] A.C. 1, at p. g .

564

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[VOL . XLVIII

would have to regard the failure to make the purchase as a default
on the part of the deceased . The other members of the court appeared to agree with this reasoning .
Given that the deceased had assumed an obligation to purchase a house, the conclusions drawn by MacKay J .A., are above
criticism . If the deceased's failure to purchase the house was
prima facie a breach of trust, the estate could not rely on that
failure to establish a resulting trust without first displacing the
prima facie presumption .
It had been argued for the appellant, however, that the deceased had not assumed any such obligation . If he had done so,
then, in the absence of evidence of waiver or estoppel, the widow
was clearly entitled to succeed either under a trust or, indeed,
in contract . If he had not done so, the arguments in her favour,
although by no means hopeless, were less compelling .
Certainly the terms of the agreement were open to the construction that it was designed merely to ensure that the bonds were
removed from the possession of the deceased until he wished to
use them for the purchase of a house or until he and his wife
agreed to use them for some other purpose . On this view of the
document there was no imperative duty to purchase a house and,
in order to succeed, it would have been vital for the widow to
convince the court that the bonds were impressed with an immediate trust for the joint benefit of the parties whatever event
might occur in the future . To this end, she could rely only on the
stipulation that the house which might be bought should be
retained in joint ownership, the statement that the deceased wished
to ensure his future wife's "financial security and well-being" and
the provision for instructions to be given to the solicitor by both
parties in writing . These matters received no judicial discussion
as it is implicit in the reasoning of Ferguson J ., that the husband
had assumed the duty to make the purchase and, as has been
seen, the members of the Court of Appeal appeared to favour
the same conclusion.
It is unfortunate that only ,the proceedings at first instance
produced a written opinion which will be preserved in the law
reports . That opinion is, at the best, misleading in its treatment
and application of basic equitable principles .
MAURICE C. CULLITY *

'Maurice C . Cullity, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University .

